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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This action was conunenced by American Savings & Loan 
Association, which sought to foreclose a mortgage (trust 
deed) against both appellants and respondents as parties 
holding some interest in the subject parcel of residential 
realty. Appellants (Blomquist) had sold the property to 
respondents (Sellars) on a Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
subject to the mortgage. After service of process by the 
1ortgagee, respondents cross-claimed against appellants. 
[n turn, appellants counterclaimed against respondents, 
isserting that respondents were in default under the terms 
jf said real estate contract. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BELOW 
After the trial court had earlier disposed of the 
:-i.:;'i:12l rortgage foreclosure action by entering swnrnary 
i!-: L'1vor of the rnort92aee, the '--Liirns of Lmbc; 
respondents came on for trial. Upon stipuL1tion C\f tlH' 
I ;arties in open court, it was agreed that certain facts were 
uncontroverted, which facts were embodied in the court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court then 
jetermined that both parties were in default and that neither 
was entitled to relief, whereupon the court dismissed the 
:laims of both parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of dismissal 
Jf their claims against respondents. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
On the 6th day of December, 1965, appellants entered intc 
o Uniform Real Estate Contract with respondents. (F.F. No. 2, 
q• 168) At that time, appellants were in the fact position 
in the complaint of plaintiff American Savings & 
Association and finally determined by judgment in favor 
)f said plaintiff dated October 30, 1968. (F.F. No. 3, R. 16E 
Respondents made regular monthly payments until they werE 
erved with swnmons by said plaintiff in the above-entitled 
c,ction, at which time they discontinued regular payments. 
-2-
t . 
<cLl tiff on February 16, l 9G 7. ( l\. Gel) 
On or about February 27, 1967, appellants declared that 
respondents were in default by failure to make said payments, 
snd appellants demanded immediate payment of the full contract. 
1:-,lcince in the amount of $33,885.87. (R. 76) Simultaneously, L 
elected to treat the contract as a mortgage, as 
xuvided in paragraph 16C of said contract (R. 32), and 
:,-oceeded to foreclose same. (R. 75) 
After said discontinuation of payments in February, 
: %7, respondents commenced payments only upon the appointment 
)f a receiver o (FF No. 4, R. 168) The receiver was appointee 
by order dated November 14, 1967. (R. 96-97) 
On October 30, 1968, the court entered summary judgment 
in favor of plaintiff mortgagee and against all of the other 
parties, foreclosing the plaintiff's mortgage, declaring 
111 other interests inferior to those of plaintiff, and 
ollowing a deficiency judgment against appellants (FF No. 1, 
:i. 168) The total judgment against appellants amounted to 
including attorney's fees and costs of suit. 
,R. 139) Appellants took no appeal from that judgment, which 




On January J, 1969, the latter claims came on for trial 
:jd'Jre the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow. Al though the parties 
' ere :xepo.red to testify, upon stipulation the parties agreed 
::c ta in undisputed facts which the cow_·t i b; 
1 dndings of Fact. (R. 167-68) From those f .-1cts the court 
I concluded that respondents were in default under their contra 
with appellants. (C.L. No. 4, R. 169) 
The court also concluded that appellants were: 
"in default of the contract at the time it was 
entered into and were subsequently foreclosed 
and precluded from any further interest therein 
for the reason that the provisions in the con-
tract were dependent and could not be enforced 
while in default and that the said Blomquists 
were not entitled to foreclose the title to 
property they had previously been foreclosed 
out of themselves." 
(C.L. No. 4, R. 169-70) 
Consequently, the court entered judgment dismissing 
appellants' claims against respondents, on the ground of 
"no cause of action." CR. 1 72) For that reason, the court 
concluded that it was unnecessary to take testimony as to 
damages. (C.L. No. 4, R. 169) 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' 
CLAIM, AS STATING NO CAUSE OF ACTION, WHERE 
RESPONDENTS-VENDEES WERE CLEARLY IN DEFAULT 
UNDER THEIR REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WITH APPELLANTS-
VENDORS AND THERE WAS NO SHOWING THAT VENDORS 
COULD NOT HAVE CONVEYED GOOD TITLE UPON RECEIPT 






Th•, court below ;1pp<Jrently proceeded on the assumption 
;;r.J d12foc,ul t by the vendor with respect to the payment 
=.;. ur-.:::.'.erl:/ing obligc.tior. c.gc.inst the subject real property 
:ecessc.rily excused the vendee from his obligations on the 
:ontract. '::"hat is not the law, here or elsewhere. 
The basic rule has been clearly stated by this Court: 
"(W)e acknowledge our accord with the rule ••• 
that the vendor in a real estate contract gen-
erally not obliged to have full and clear 
marketable title at all times during the 
pendency of his contract of sale because, 
ordinarily, title need not be conveyed until 
the fin:i.l payment is made or tendered ••• •" 
Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 U.2d 220, 357 P.2d 190, 192-93 (1960) 
(emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Woodard v. Allen, 1 U.2d 220, 265 P.2d 
J98 (1953), this Court held that a contract vendee could not 
justify his refusal to make payments under his contract by 
claiming that the vendor could not deliver good title, since t 
there was no requirement for conveyance of title until the 
vendee had made the payments required of him by contract. 
Accord: McKellar Real Est. & Inv. Co. v. Paxton, 62 U. 97, 
')18 Pac. 128 (1923); 55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser El 280,l ' 
pp. 724-25; Annot.-Time for Questioning Vendor's Title, 109 
".LR 242 et seq. 
Arguably
1 
some support for the decision below could be 
-5-
- -- .c:.':cn In\-. '=o. ':. horne, 59 LT. 156, 202 Pac. 
contract he would lose both his pi1.yments to dll insolvent 
,_,endor and the land to a foreclosing lienor. However, certai 
critical facts distinguish that case from ours: 
"It should be borne in mind that the premises 
described in the contract between Romney and 
the defendant included only a part (in fact 
a small part) of the premises in the contract 
given by McEwan to Romney. Romney was not 
able to meet the payments due under his con-
tract with McEwan merely by the defendant 
continuing to make the monthly payments 
provided for in his contract. This is not, 
therefore, a case in which the defendant 
might have the right to demand that his pay-
ments should be applied in removing any 
encumbrance upon or curing any defect in the 
vendor's title." 
202 Pac. at 549. 
Thus, in Horne there was no prospect of paying off all 
encumbrances on the large tract of land of which the contract 
in question pertained only to a small part, looking only to 
the contract payments, whereas in our case if respondents 
had paid the $33,885.87 balance demanded by appellants after 
cespondents had defaulted, appellants could easily have paid 
off the mortgagee who, after another year of litigation, 
finally wound up with a total judgment of $32,775.92 
(including attorney fees and costs). 
-6-
- . . \-2::.:::ee to ;""'Y c'11 the' c']t',11· t·itJ,· 
1i·;·e C3.lifornia Court of Appeals has so held: 
"Plaintiff asserts that he was not tendered a 
merchantable title, because ••• the vendor 
did not tender him a deed to the property free 
from encumbrance. 
* ... * 
"As to the fact that the record showed the 
property to be incumbered with a deed of trust 
• • • we are of the opinion that this defect 
was remedied by the tender to the plaintiff by 
the vendor's agent of the reconveyance by said 
trustees. This reconveyance was properly drawn 
and acknowledged; and it was handed to the 
vendor's agents with the understanding that upon 
repayment of the amount of the loan they were to 
take the necessary steps to release the property 
from the incumbrance. The vendor had a right to 
rely on the purchase money to liquidate the in-
debtedness secured by the deed of trust. 
Webster v. Kings County Trust Co., 80 Hun. 420, 
30 N.Y. Supp. 357; Ziehen v. Smith, supra. 
The $4,650 due at the time of the tender, and 
the $1,350 already in the hands of the vendor's 
agents, were more than sufficient for this 
purpose." 
Griesemer v. Hammond, 18 Cal. App. 535, 123 Pac. 818, 820 
(1912) (emphasis added). 
Does it change the result when the vendor has defaulted 
1211 an underlying encumbrance so as to precipitate a fore-
losure action? No, the California Court of Appeals has 
the Same .rule even after a sheriff's sale has 
-7-
"We believe that it is entirely clear that the 
seller was not required to have title to the 
property 0t the time of making the contract of 
c.:3le, but W'Cls only required to be able to con-
·:Ey title to the purchaser at the time fixed 
":Y.i ss.ic contract for such conveyance •••• 
Under -'.:'.le terms of said contract, the seller 
h'2S '1.ct recuired to convey except 'upon receiving 
the fdl ;::;urchase price' in installment payments 
with interest as therein provided, or, at the 
option of the purchaser, upon payment of the 
entire unpaid balance of the purchase price at 
any time prior to default by the purchaser. 
But here respondent ceased making his payments 
s'.-'.ortly after the foreclosure sale and at least 
ten r.,cnths before the period for redemption had 
expired and never made a tender of the balance 
of the purchase price or any part thereof. This 
was a breach of the contract by respondent unless 
the mere permitting of the foreclosure sale con-
stituted a prior breach on the part of appellants 
relieving respondent from this obligation to con-
tinue such payments. In our opinion, it did not 
• • • o In the present case there was no unre-
mov able defect in the title because of the fore-
closure sale, and the seller had a right to rely 
upon the purchase money to redeem from said 
sale. In this connection it may be stated that 
while the indebtedness secured by the mortgage 
was less than $5,000 at the time of the sale, 
the evidence showed that there was $10,000 
remaining unpaid on the outstanding contracts 
of sale." 
Lloyd v. Locke-Paddon Land Co., 5 Cal. App.2d 211, 42 P.2d 
367, 368-69 (1935)(emphasis added). 
In our case, paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real Estate 
provides that "the Seller on receiving the payments 
herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner 
-8-
ju vc::: mentioned cigrees to execute ,=md deliver to the Duyer 
a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying 
=.-.t:: -:i-=.le to the above described prer..h:es free ,-qnd clear of 
Under the auU1ori ties 1>'e h-:1 ve ci teJ, the triL1l court 
'eLLCd in dismissing appellants• claims against respondents. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants are entitled to a reversal of the judgment 
'.:if dismissal below, and the case should be remanded for trial 
on the issue of damages or other appropriate reliefe 
-9-
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard L. Young 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellants 
Blomquist 
